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RECENT DECISIONS
tract he had a period of about fifteen days within which he could
legally withdraw from the union. When he exercised this option, pres-
sure was placed upon the Company to fire him. It was this pressure
which constituted the unfair labor practice under section 158(3) of the
Federal Act,"' and which in turn gave the Federal Board jurisdiction
of the case.
Prior to the decision in the principal case, the conflict between state
and federal jurisdiction in the matter of union certification had been
clearly resolved. While it is perhaps unfortunate that this case was
dismissed with a terse per curiam decision, nevertheless it cannot be
said to be in conflict with previous decisions. The Algoma case had left
'open' to state regulation, those fields of unfair labor practices not in-
tended to be covered by the Federal Law. The principal case simply
limits in one more instance those so-called 'open' fields. While the new
Labor-Management Relations Act does contain a provision allowing
the Federal Board to cede its jurisdiction to State Boards under cer-
tain circumstances, the tendency of the courts today, plus the rather
complete condification of the new Act, indicates that federal jurisdic-
tion will be upheld whenever possible.
RICHAARD P. BUELLESBACH
Evidence - Admissibility of Parol Evidence to Show a Written Con-
tract to Be a Sham-The plaintiff contractor alleged that the defendant
made an oral agreement with him whereby he was to construct a house
for the defendant's daughter and son-in-law on a cost plus basis. Later
the plaintiff was induced to enter into a written contract with the
daughter and son-in-law for the specified consideration of $12,500, with
the understanding, however, that the written agreement would not be
binding; it was only to keep th defendant's brother from learning
the cost of the house or for whom it was to be built. The defandant
denied that an oral agreement existed, contending that the written
agreement embodied the complete contract except that he had orally
agreed to pay the plaintiff an additional $2,500 as a gratuity to indilce
completion of the building. The plaintiff sued for the difference be-
tween the ambunt the defendant had paid and the consideration spe--
cified in the oral contract. Held: Parol evidence was admissible to.
show that the written contract was to be of no binding force and was.
entered into only as a sham. Mardon et. al. v. Ferris, 43 N.W. (2d) 904"
(Mich., 1950).
1s 29 U.S.C. 158(3) "By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment
or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage member-
ship in any labor organization.. !'
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
It is a settled rule that parol evidence is not admissible to vary,
modify, or contradict a written contract.' It is equally well settled that
the parol evidence rule applies to building contracts as well as to other
agreements.2 The general rule prohibiting a change or variance in a
written contract does not necessarily indicate that a contract, whole and
complete on its face, cannot be entirely overthrown by parol evidence.
3
There is disagreement among authorities upon the question whether
parol evidence is admissible to show a written contract is a sham, i.e.,
that the purpose at the time of the execution was not to express a
contractual relation between the parties. Some jurisdictions contend
that such evidence is inadmissible since the contract, regular and com-
plete on its face, was entered into for the purpose of deceiving or in-
ducing some third person to perform a certain act. Other courts fol-
lowing the contract theory hold that a written contract, although ap-
pearing complete, can never in fact be binding if it was the intention
of the parties not to be so bound.4 Wigmore would allow the intro-
duction of parol evidence showing a written contract to be a sham only
when its purpose is morally justifiable, i.e., contracts to calm a lunatic
or console a dying person.5 Other courts refuse to admit parol evi-
dence, stating simply that it would upset the sanctity of written con-
tracts.
In the case of Booye v. Ries,6 parol evidence was excluded which
would have shown that the written agreement was entered into only
to induce the defendant's father to make a loan. The court did not
discuss the effect of fraud upon a third person. The Minnesota court
has refused to admit this evidence where the purpose involved a fraud
upon a third person. Graham v. Savage7 involved an oral compensation
for services agreement between the plaintiff salesman and the defen-
dant employer. The defendant requested the plaintiff to sign a written
contract for a smaller sum, for the express purpose of showing the
other salesmen that the plaintiff was not drawing a larger salary. It
was agreed at the execution of the written contract that it was to have
no effect and the oral agreement would remain binding. The court
would not allow the introduction of parol evidence since the avowed
purpose of the contract was to deceive or defraud. The court would
not make, "an exception in aid of such an illegitimate purpose and in
violation of common honesty."
132 C.J.S. 784, sec. 851.
232 C.J.S. 824, sec.. 904.
3 20 Am. Jur. 955, sec. 1094.
4 Williston on Contracts, Vol. 3, p. 1822, sec. 634.
5 Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 9, p. 16, sec. 2406 (1940).6 102 N.J.L. 322, 134 A. 86 (1926).
7 110 Minn. 510, 126 N.W. 394 (1910): See also 19 Ann. Cas. 1022.
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A New York case involving fraud upon a third person allowed the
admission of parol evidence, "to show that the writing which purported
to be an agreement was not, in fact, intended by the plaintiff and de-
fendant as such." This case was reversed on appeal, but on the ground
that the parol agreement was void under the statute of frauds. The
New York court in an earlier decision said:
"This is in avoidance of the instrument and not to change it, and
I do not see why the testimony was not as competent in this
case as it would be to show that a written instrument was ob-
tained fraudulently, by duress or in an improper manner. Such
evidence does not come within the ordinary rule of introducing
parol evidence to contradict written testimony...-9
In the majority of cases the parties to the oral and written contracts
are identical. In the instant case, however, the beneficiary. of the oral
agreement contracted in writing with one of the parties to the oral
agreement. The Michigan coufrt indicates that this would not change
the rule. With this result the Texas court'0 is in accord, although the
court did not consider the change of parties as affecting the rule. In
the instant case the court places a limitation upon the rule, however,
asserting that if one of the parties had been an innocent purchaser for
value if would be inequitable to hold the written contract a sham.
JOHN J. WITTAK
Constitutional Law - Bible Reading in Public Schools - A New Jer-
sey statute requiring daily reading of five verses of the Old Testament
of the Holy Bible without comment, and permitting repetition of the
Lord's Prayer in each public school classroom, was challenged as to its
constitutionality under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution. Held: The statute did not .contravene the
"establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment nor the
"privileges and immunities" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, since
such reading was not designed to inculcate any particular dogma, creed,
belief, or mode of worship. Doremus et at v. Board of Education of
Borough of Hawthorne et aL., 5 N.J. 435, 75 A. (2d) 880 (1950).
The court distinguished this case from the Eversone and McCollum2
cases on its facts and then proceeded to an interpretation of the First
8 Nightingale v. J. H. & C. K. Eagle Inc., 141 App. Div. 386, 126 N.Y.S. 339(1910).9 Grierson v. Mason, 60 N.Y. 394, 397 (1875): See also Coffman v. Malone, 98
Neb. 819, 154 N.W. 726 (1915); 1917 B.L.R.A. 263.
10 Bernard v. Fidelity Union Casualty Co., Tex. Civ. App, 296 S.W. 693 (1927).
Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing et al., 330 U.S. 1,
67 S. Ct. 504, 91 L. Ed. 711, 168 A.L.R. 1392 (1947).2 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education of School District No. 71,
Champaign County, Illinois, et al., 333 U.S. 203, 68 S. Ct 461, 92 L. Ed. 649,
2 A.L.R (2d) 1338 (1948).
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